A New Front in Space Security
Space launches have always faced physical risks — weather, mechanical failure, the unforgiving physics of getting to orbit. Now they face a threat that doesn't show up on a radar screen: cyberattacks targeting the digital infrastructure that coordinates, controls, and communicates with launch vehicles and their ground support systems.
The United States Space Force has responded by establishing dedicated cyber defense squadrons at the two primary launch sites in the continental United States: Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida and Vandenberg Space Force Base in California. The new units are tasked specifically with protecting launch operations from malicious hacks, filling a gap that Space Force leadership has acknowledged exists as the frequency and sophistication of attacks on space infrastructure increases.
The move reflects a broader recognition within the US national security community that space is no longer a sanctuary. The same connectivity that makes modern launch operations more efficient — networked sensors, digital telemetry, cloud-based coordination systems — also creates attack surfaces that adversaries are increasingly capable of exploiting.
Why Rocket Launches Are a Target
From an adversary's perspective, the appeal of targeting launch infrastructure is clear. A successful cyberattack that delays, disrupts, or destroys a high-value launch could achieve strategic effects far out of proportion to the cost of the attack. Military communications satellites, intelligence-gathering payloads, and GPS replenishment missions all travel to orbit on rockets that must pass through vulnerable digital chokepoints before they ever leave the ground.
The threat isn't hypothetical. In February 2022, hours before Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, a cyberattack on Viasat's KA-SAT satellite network disrupted communications for Ukrainian military forces and took out tens of thousands of satellite modems across Europe. The attack demonstrated both the vulnerability of space-adjacent infrastructure and the willingness of sophisticated state actors to target it as part of a broader conflict strategy.
Launch infrastructure is, in some ways, even more exposed than on-orbit assets. Satellites in orbit are physically hardened and operate on specialized protocols, while launch facilities are connected to contractor networks, commercial cloud services, and communications systems that share infrastructure with the civilian internet. The attack surface is larger, the dependencies more complex, and the consequences of interference potentially catastrophic.
What the New Squadrons Will Do
The Space Force has described the new cyber defense squadrons as focused on protecting the networks, systems, and communications links that support launch operations at both sites. This includes monitoring for intrusion attempts, hardening the security posture of critical ground systems, and maintaining the ability to detect and respond to attacks in progress during the narrow window of a launch countdown.
Launch countdowns are particularly vulnerable periods. During the final hours before a rocket leaves the pad, teams across multiple organizations — the launch provider, the payload customer, range safety officials, and the Space Force itself — are in constant communication over networks that must remain available and uncorrupted. A targeted attack timed to the most sensitive phase of a launch could cause delays at minimum or potentially compromise range safety systems.
The new squadrons will also conduct threat intelligence work, tracking adversarial groups known to target US space and defense infrastructure and working to anticipate attack vectors before they are exploited.
The Growing Militarization of Space Cybersecurity
The Space Force's move follows a series of policy and organizational changes reflecting the service's evolving understanding of its cyber responsibilities. Space Force was created in December 2019 as the sixth branch of the US military with a mandate to protect US interests in space. Its cyber mission has grown steadily as the dependence of US military operations on space-based capabilities has become more apparent and more contested.
China and Russia have both invested heavily in counter-space capabilities — technologies and tactics designed to degrade, disrupt, or destroy US space assets. These include kinetic capabilities such as anti-satellite missiles tested by both countries, electronic warfare including GPS jamming and spoofing, and cyber operations targeting the ground infrastructure supporting space systems.
By placing dedicated cyber defense units at the physical sites where US rockets launch, Space Force is acknowledging that protecting US space capabilities requires defending the full chain from ground to orbit — not just the vehicles and satellites themselves, but the digital nervous system that keeps them functioning.
Commercial Space and the Security Gap
The establishment of Space Force cyber units at government launch facilities raises a related question: what about commercial launches? SpaceX's Falcon 9 carries government payloads from Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg regularly, but the company's infrastructure is primarily commercial. Blue Origin, United Launch Alliance, and Rocket Lab operate under varying degrees of government oversight and security requirement.
As the commercial launch industry expands and takes on more national security missions, the cybersecurity standards applied to those companies' infrastructure will become increasingly important. The Space Force's new squadrons represent the government's own perimeter defense, but the boundaries between government and commercial systems in the launch environment are porous enough that an attack targeting a commercial contractor's network could still affect a national security mission.
The new squadrons at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg are a start — a recognition that the threat is real, the stakes are high, and the era of treating launch infrastructure as inherently secure is over.
This article is based on reporting by SpaceNews. Read the original article.
