US Space Command and Allies Are Writing a Joint Plan for Orbital Warfare

Space defense planning is moving from abstract coordination to operational design

US Space Command says it is working with six close allies on a joint plan for how to conduct future orbital warfare, with completion expected by the end of 2026. The effort, described by SPACECOM Commander Gen. Stephen Whiting, would create a collective concept of operations for the defense of orbital assets across the Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender group.

That may sound bureaucratic, but it marks an important shift. Allied militaries have spent years discussing threats to satellites and the need to protect space systems. What Whiting described goes further by asking how those countries would actually integrate capabilities, avoid conflict with one another’s actions, and operate together in a real contingency.

In military planning terms, that is the difference between sharing concerns and building a framework for action.

Who is involved

The planning group tied to Olympic Defender includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. According to the source report, the multinational body has largely served as a combined military space operations planning cell. Over the past year, however, SPACECOM has been working to turn that planning function into something closer to operational capability, including through more joint exercises.

The proposed orbital warfare plan would be the first of its kind for the group. It is especially notable because not every partner has publicly embraced the need for its military to conduct space war. Still, the report notes that Australia, France, Germany, and the UK have in recent years expressed interest in developing counterspace capabilities.

That growing alignment helps explain why the coalition believes the time has come for a common operating concept rather than separate national conversations.

What the plan is meant to do

Whiting said the countries involved have been discussing the need for protect-and-defend capabilities and broader orbital warfare capabilities. The next step is to determine how national tools can be leveraged together.

At the most basic level, the plan is meant to deconflict activity. In any future space confrontation, allied operators would need to avoid interfering with each other’s systems or responses. But Whiting’s formulation goes further than that. He said the objective is not just deconfliction, but integration, synchronization, and synergy.

That language suggests a maturing view of space operations. Satellites and related systems are no longer treated simply as passive support enablers for terrestrial forces. They are becoming recognized as assets that may have to be actively protected in an environment where adversaries can contest access, disrupt operations, or threaten spacecraft directly.

Why the language matters

The term orbital warfare carries political weight because it moves the conversation away from resilience and toward conflict planning. The US Space Force already defines orbital warfare as one of its core missions. In its future-oriented Objective Force document, it describes the mission as involving not only protective actions for US space systems but also offensive and defensive counterspace operations in support of joint force maneuver and fires.

That framing matters because it shows how military space doctrine is evolving. The issue is no longer limited to defending satellites against accidental hazards or isolated interference. It increasingly includes the possibility of active military competition in orbit, including actions designed to deny or degrade an adversary’s capabilities while preserving one’s own.

A multinational concept of operations therefore carries significance beyond paperwork. It signals that close US allies are trying to define how collective defense principles might extend into the orbital domain.

Operational consequences

If completed this year as expected, the plan could become a reference point for future exercises, capability development, and alliance burden-sharing in space. Countries do not all bring the same hardware, authorities, or doctrine. A shared framework can help clarify roles and reveal gaps before a crisis forces those decisions under pressure.

It could also influence procurement and force design. Once governments decide they want interoperable or complementary orbital defense capabilities, they may begin funding systems and training structures that fit the shared concept. In that sense, a CONOPS can shape future investment as much as it shapes current planning.

The diplomatic implications are also substantial. Some governments have been cautious about openly discussing combat in space, preferring language about security, resilience, or responsible behavior. A more explicit allied plan for orbital warfare may sharpen those debates by making the military dimension harder to sidestep.

A sign of where strategic competition is headed

The report does not suggest that conflict in space is inevitable. It does show that the United States and several of its closest partners increasingly believe they must prepare for the possibility in practical terms. That is a meaningful shift in posture.

For years, military space policy often emphasized the importance of satellites while leaving the mechanics of collective defense somewhat vague. This effort starts to narrow that gap. It takes the premise that orbital assets matter to modern warfare and asks the next unavoidable question: if those assets are threatened, how will allies fight to protect them together?

By the end of 2026, the answer may be more concrete than it has ever been before.

This article is based on reporting by Breaking Defense. Read the original article.