Stealth Aircraft Mimic Iranian Shahed-136 Drones in US War Games

How the Exercises Work

In recent exercises conducted at military ranges in Nevada and New Mexico, KX-2 aircraft flew simulated attack profiles against ground-based air defense units and naval task forces. The aircraft approached targets from multiple directions at varying altitudes, sometimes in coordinated groups designed to simulate the saturation tactics that Shahed drones employ in combat.

Ground and shipboard crews practiced detecting the incoming threats using a mix of radar, acoustic sensors, and visual observation. They then engaged the surrogates using electronic simulations of weapon systems including the Coyote counter-drone interceptor, directed-energy weapons, and conventional gun-based close-in weapons systems (CIWS). The exercises were scored using the electronic augmentation pods on the KX-2s, which recorded whether engagement criteria had been met.

Multi-Domain Integration

The training scenarios went beyond simple air defense drills. Exercise planners integrated the drone surrogate flights into broader operational scenarios that included simultaneous cyber attacks on air defense networks, electronic warfare jamming of communications and radar, and coordinated strikes by simulated cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. This multi-domain approach is designed to stress-test the ability of US forces to maintain air defense effectiveness even when multiple other threats are competing for attention and resources.

Participating units reported that the exercises provided significantly more realistic training than previous counter-UAS drills. "The KX-2 gives us something we have never had before — a live, breathing threat that behaves like the drones we are reading about in intelligence reports every day," said a senior officer involved in the exercise planning. "You cannot replicate that experience with a PowerPoint briefing or a tabletop exercise."

Broader Implications for US Readiness

The use of manned surrogate aircraft for drone training reflects the broader challenge the US military faces in adapting to asymmetric threats. The Shahed-136 and its variants have proven devastatingly effective in Ukraine, where they have forced Kyiv to expend expensive Western-supplied air defense missiles to counter drones that cost a fraction of the interceptor price. The Houthis have used similar weapons to disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea, demonstrating that low-cost drones can have strategic effects far out of proportion to their material cost.

Preparing US forces to counter these threats requires training that is both realistic and scalable. The KX-2 program addresses the realism requirement, but questions remain about scalability. Each exercise requires multiple aircraft, trained pilots, and significant coordination with range safety authorities. Expanding the program to provide regular training for the large number of units that might face drone threats in a major conflict will require additional investment in aircraft, personnel, and training infrastructure.

Analysis: Innovation Born of Necessity

The KestrelX KX-2 program is a creative response to a real operational need. By repurposing a manned aircraft designed for special operations into a drone surrogate, the military has found a way to provide realistic training without waiting for purpose-built unmanned target systems to work through the acquisition pipeline.

This kind of pragmatic improvisation — using what is available now rather than waiting for the perfect solution later — is exactly the mindset the Department of Defense needs to cultivate as it confronts the rapid evolution of drone warfare. The lessons learned from these exercises will inform not only tactics and training, but also the development of next-generation counter-drone systems that must be effective against threats that are continuously evolving.

The KX-2 program may be a stopgap, but it is a smart one. In an era where the threat is evolving faster than the acquisition system can respond, getting realistic training into the hands of frontline units today matters more than fielding a perfect training system years from now.

This article is based on reporting by The Drive. Read the original article.